摘要
The previous chapters have described Eddington’s attempt to work out an interpretation of the physical sciences which would combine operationalism and its consequent subjectivism with the causal theory and its concomitant implication of a non-sensible, real world. I have argued that there is no contradiction in such an effort, that operationalism is a restricted doctrine whose validity and value are confined to the actual working of physicists, while the broader perspective which seeks to place the physical sciences in their context is appropriate to a full philosophical interpretation of those sciences. The physicist in his laboratory need not be concerned with the genesis of sensation or with its causal antecedents: his concern as a worker in the field of physics is only with the data of his machines and instruments. It is from these that he strives to construct a world. But very few physicists, of course, content themselves with such compartmentalized duties, with such narrow, inhuman reflections. It is in his concern with the origins of his data and their significance that the working scientist becomes a philosopher. We have seen how Köhler insists that even the working scientist must look beyond his data in order to impart meaning to them, the context within the phenomenal field constituting the base from which meaning arises for the pointer readings.
摘要译文
试图解释物理科学的解释，这种解释将操作主义及其随之而来的主观主义与因果理论及其伴随的非理性暗示相结合，真实世界。我认为这种努力没有矛盾，即操作主义是一种限制性学说，其有效性和价值仅限于物理学家的实际工作，而寻求将物理科学置于其背景中的更广泛视角适合于对这些科学的完整哲学解释。他的实验室不需要关心感觉的起源或其因果关系的前因：他作为物理学领域的工人的关注只与他的机器和仪器的数据有关。正是由于这些，他努力构建一个世界。但是，当然，很少有物理学家满足于这种狭隘，不人道的反思。正是由于他对数据的起源以及工作科学家成为哲学家的重要性的关注。我们已经看到科勒如何坚持认为即使是工作科学家也必须超越他的数据才能赋予他们意义，构成基础的现象场内的上下文，指针读数的含义从该基础出现。
John W. Yolton. The Doctrine of Structure. The Philosophy of Science of A. S. Eddington[M].DE: Springer, 1960: 40-66