摘要
This chapter argues that the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God is a straightforwardly legitimate argument. The fine-tuning argument takes certain features of fundamental physics to confirm the existence of God because these features of fundamental physics are more likely given the existence of God than they are given the non-existence of God. And any such argument is straightforwardly legitimate, as such arguments follow a canonically legitimate form of empirical argumentation. The chapter explores various objections to the fine-tuning argument: that it requires an ill-defined notion of small changes in the laws of physics, that it over-generalizes, that it requires implausible presuppositions about divine intentions, and that it is debunked by anthropic reasoning. In each case it finds either that the putatively objectionable feature of the fine-tuning argument is inessential to it or that the putatively objectionable feature of the fine-tuning argument is not actually objectionable.
摘要译文
本章认为，关于上帝存在的微调论点是直接合法的论点。微调论点采用基本物理学的某些特征来确认上帝的存在，因为基本物理学的这些特征在存在上帝的情况下比在不存在上帝的情况下更有可能。任何此类论点都是直接合法的，因为此类论点遵循经验论证的规范合法形式。本章探讨了对微调论点的各种反对意见：它要求对物理学定律的微小变化有一个不明确的定义，对它的过度概括，需要对神的意图有不合理的预设，并且被认为是不正确的人类的推理。在每种情况下，它都发现或者说微调参数的假定不利特征对它而言是无关紧要的，或者是说微调参数的假定不利特征实际上并不具有异议。
Yoaav Isaacs. 7 Fine-Tuning Fine-Tuning. Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology[M].UK: Oxford, 2018